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Abstract 
This study assesses linkages between social media and governance dynamics in 49 African 
countries for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on ordinary least squares and 
quantile regressions. Ten bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are used, notably: (i) 
political governance (entailing “voice & accountability” and political stability/no violence); 
(ii) economic governance (involving regulation quality and government effectiveness); (iii) 
institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and corruption-control) and (iv) general 
governance (entailing political, economic and institutional governance). Social media is 
measured with Facebook penetration. The findings show that Facebook penetration is 
positively associated with governance dynamics and these positive nexuses differ in terms of 
significance and magnitude of significance throughout the conditional distribution of the 
governance dynamics.  
JEL Classification: G20; O38; O40; O55; P37 
Keywords: Governance; Social media; Africa  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The motivation of this study builds on three main factors, notably: (i) the growing importance 
of information and communication technology (ICT); (ii) the policy syndrome of poor 
governance in African development and (iii) gaps in the Facebook penetration literature. We 
discuss the points in chronological order2. 
                                                          
2
 Governance is used to imply good governance throughout the study.  
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 First, while there is a growing strand of literature on the importance of ICT in 
development outcomes, this literature is also consistent with the view that, opportunities of 
ICT penetration are more apparent in Africa because more developed markets in North 
America, Europe and Asia have reached levels of saturation (Penard et al., 2012; Asongu, 
2018; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018. Abor et al., 
2018; Gosavi, 2018;  Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2018a, 2018b). An implication is that the 
penetration potential in Africa can be leveraged to address glaring policy syndromes such as 
poor governance (Asongu et al., 2019).  
 Second, Africa’s poverty tragedy of underdevelopment has been documented to be 
substantially linked to poor governance, inter alia: deinstitutionalization of the continent 
(Nunn & Puga, 2012); loss of traditional institutions (Lewis, 1955; Amavilah, 2016) and poor 
contemporary institutions (Adewole & Osabuohien, 2007; Efobi et al., 2013; Andrés et al., 
2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b). Despite the scant literature on 
the importance of ICT in institutional development in Africa (Snow, 2009; Mathias, 2012; 
Porter et al., 2015; Gagliardone, 2016; Asongu et al., 2019), the dimension of social media 
has not been explored. Building on these underpinnings, a strand of the literature has focused 
on assessing the importance of ICT in governance in Africa (Snow, 2009; Mathias, 2012; 
Porter et al., 2015; Gagliardone, 2016). Snow (2009) has established that a nexus exist 
between corruption and mobile phone penetration. According to Mathias (2012), 
accountability and openness are strongly increased through mobile connectivity. Porter et al. 
(2015) establish that increasing mobile phone penetration enhances participative governance 
from the youth. The relevance of radio-mobile interactions has been examined by Gagliardone 
(2016) who has concluded that such linkages improve government quality. Despite the scant 
literature on the importance of ICT in institutional development in Africa, the dimension of 
social media has been largely unexplored. This is essentially because of social media data 
availability constraints. 
 Third, as far as we have reviewed, only three studies have examined the effects of 
Facebook penetration using macroeconomic data. The impact of social media on governing 
natural resources has been investigated by Kodila-Tedika (2018) whereas Jha and Sarangi 
(2017) have assessed the importance of social media in fighting corruption. The study has 
been extended by Jha and Kodila-Tedika (2018) who have examined whether democracy is 
promoted by social media. While the three studies above have concluded that social media 
respectively increases the governance of natural resources, reduces corruption and promotes 
democracy, two fundamental shortcomings are apparent in light of the discourse from the 
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previous two strands, notably: (i) the findings provide global perspectives instead of African-
centric results and (ii) one or two governance outcome variables are employed. In extending 
the literature, the present study fills the identified gaps by using quantile regressions to assess 
correlates between social media and ten governance dynamics in Africa.  The governance 
dynamics consists of political stability/no violence, voice and accountability, political 
governance, government effectiveness, regulation quality, economic governance, corruption-
control, the rule of law, institutional governance and general governance. The four 
governance variables consist of the other six governance indicators that are bundled through 
principal component analysis.  
 The interest of bundling governance variables builds on the fact that it is misleading to 
employ economic terms in the interpretation of economic phenomena unless such terms are 
substantiated with empirical validity. For instance, it is inappropriate to employ economic 
governance unless it entails both government effectiveness and regulation quality. Hence, four 
composite governance variables are considered, notably: (i) political governance (entailing 
“voice & accountability” and political stability/no violence); (ii) economic governance 
(involving regulation quality and government effectiveness); (iii) institutional governance 
(comprising the rule of law and corruption-control) and (iv) general governance (entailing 
political, economic and institutional governance).   The underlying strategy of unbundling and 
bundling governance variables has been employed in recent literature in order to increase 
room for policy implications (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2017).   
 The importance of employing quantile regressions in an estimation strategy builds on 
the fact that correlates based on mean values of the governance dynamics may be ineffective 
unless they are contingent on existing values of governance dynamics and tailored differently 
across countries with varying levels of governance quality. In summary, by leveraging on a 
new social media dataset in order to contribute to the extant literature, this study also responds 
to growing calls for more scholarly research on the importance of information technology in 
development outcomes in developing countries (Whitacre et al., 2014 ; Jogernson & Vu, 
2016; Pradhan et al., 2014 ; Sujarwoto & Tampubolon, 2016; Muthinja, 2018; Minkoua Nzie, 
2018; Tchamyou, 2018a, 2018b; Tchamyou et al., 2018; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Hubani 
& Wiese, 2018; Issahaku et al., 2018;Bongomin et al., 2018; Efobi et al., 2018).   
 The rest of the study is organised in the following manner. Theoretical insights and 
testable hypotheses are discussed in section 2 while section 3 covers the data and 
methodology. Section 4 discloses the empirical results and corresponding discussion. We 
conclude in section 5 with implications and future research directions. 
5 
 
2. Theoretical insights and hypotheses development  
 
Whereas the primary function of social media is not for policy exchanges, it can nonetheless 
influence policy development, especially in the area of governance. How facebook 
penetration can be related to governance and by extension policy development is discussed in 
this section. While no formal and universally accepted theoretical framework has been 
established on the nexus between ICT and governance, beyond the scope of theoretical 
foundations, it is relevant to articulate that theory-building can be enhanced by applied 
econometrics that is motivated by sound intuition in the light of arguments drawn from 
existing theoretical underpinnings. Within this analytical perspective, we are consistent with 
attendant literature in arguing that the scope of applied econometrics should not be limited 
exclusively to studies that reject or accept hypotheses founded on existing theoretical 
frameworks (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011). Moreover, for new phenomena 
(e.g. social media), theory-building empirical studies are also worthwhile. In what follows, the 
theoretical arguments for the testable hypotheses are discussed. 
 Consistent with Hellstrom (2008), governance can be enhanced with ICT in the 
perspective that it improves openness, transparency and the diffusion of information between, 
inter alia:  various local government organs, government ministries, authorities and the civil 
society.  In the light of the narrative, ICT can facilitate the involvement of citizens in 
decision-making processes that affect their political, economic and institutional landscapes. 
Such participative involvement is possible because ICT is consolidating the convergence of 
societies that are informative, participative and connected (Asongu et al., 2019).  
 With respect to Snow (2009), ICT is relevant in government effectiveness. According 
to the author, in the past, limited availability of ICT provided the elites with an opportunity to 
reap preferential benefits from privileged information which ultimately motivated poor 
governance. Such monopolistic detention of information facilitated poor conditions for 
transparency and accountability, which greased enabling conditions for corruption on the part 
of the elite detaining such privileged information. Snow (2009) further posits that the overall 
effect from the burgeoning diffusion of information in Africa has been a reduction in corrupt 
behavior on the part of the ruling elite. Hence, with the popularization of ICT, barriers that 
prevent the ruling elite from scrutiny are being broken and proper cost-benefit analyses 
pertaining to investments in the public sector are being enhanced. Whereas the underlying 
theory from Snow (2009) is oriented towards corruption-control (which is a dimension of 
6 
 
institutional governance), the corresponding logic and arguments can however be extended to 
other dimensions of governance (political, economic and institutional).  
 First, on the nexus between political governance and social media, we argue that the 
latter promotes political stability/no violence as well as “voice and accountability”. This is 
essentially because social media could potentially coordinate the organization of protests of 
pacific nature which are aimed at urging authorities in place to display more openness and 
accountability towards citizens. Hence, a social media such as Facebook could be a measure 
by which to assess the ability of citizens to participate in the process of selecting their leaders 
for elected offices. Moreover, it could also be used to examine the freedom of association and 
expression enjoyed by the same citizens in mechanisms of universal suffrage that culminate in 
the election of officials.3 
Looking at the dimension of political stability in political governance, we argue that 
though social media could also be used to promote civil unrests and terrorism, the overall 
benefits in mitigating violence and abuse of power by authorities in place (including the army 
and police) are favourable towards political governance. The arguments are plausible because 
citizens are growingly conscious of the negative consequences (especially in economic 
hardship) of undemocratic transition to power or unconstitutional mechanisms that entail 
domestic violence, terrorism, coup d’etats and overthrow of elected officials.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between social media and political governance is positive 
because the former facilitates a free and fair election and replacement of political leaders. 
  
Second, the channels through which social media usage enhances economic 
governance are: regulation quality and government effectiveness. Accordingly, the 
simplification and expedition between departments of governments on the one hand and 
between citizens and government officials on the other hand, are necessary for enhanced 
participation and involvement in the design and implementation of economic measures.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Social media positively affects economic governance by influencing the 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. 
 
                                                          
3While it could also be argued that the process of electing officials by universal suffrage is not through social 
media, the information technology platform nonetheless helps in facilitating universal suffrage via enhanced 
communication and coordination. 
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 Third, institutional governance can be improved through more corruption-control and 
enhancement of the rule of law. The underpinnings of Snow (2009) discussed in the previous 
paragraphs are supportive of the intuition for a favourable relationship between social media 
and institutional governance. According to the narrative,  ICT (and by extension social media) 
has improved the respect of the rule of law, mitigated corruption and increased transparency 
because it has been unfavourable to the monopoly and manipulation of privileged information 
for private gain by a few elite.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The employment of social media favourably influencesinstitutional governance 
by enabling respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them.  
In a nutshell, the testable hypotheses and the theoretical underpinings of Snow (2009) 
align in the perspective that when information is captured by a selected few and ruling elite, it 
becomes a sources of corruption and bad governance (institutional, economic and political). 
Therefore, the decentralisation of information through social media mitigates avenues for 
unhealtthy governance practices to take root. The motivation for this association is consistent 
with the strand ofliterature on the nexus between governance and ICT (Suarez, 2006; 
Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014; Asongu et al., 2019).  
It is relevant to provide alternative arguments in order to balance the theoretical 
arguments discussed above. Accordingly, there is another strand of the literature which 
supports the view that information technology can reduce governance through collective 
action that is violent (Weidmann& Shapiro, 2015; Breuer et al., 2012; Manacorda & Tesei, 
2016; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013).Moreover, as noted by Morozov (2011), information 
technology can be used by incumbent governments to limit accountability and promote 
misinformation.  According to Asongu et al. (2019), other factors that influence the negative 
nexus between information technology and governance include the additional cost of 
increasingly using information technology to collect information that is required to: organise 
political rallies and civil protests, request reforms for economic empowerment and hold the 
elite accountable. 
In the light of the above, governments can use social media and mobile technologies to 
influence governance outcomes differently. Accordingly, some countries can place emphasis 
on political governance whereas others can be more concerned with economic governance. 
These distinct priorities depend on whether a country is sympathetic to the Beijing Model 
(which prioritises   economic governance over political governance) or to the Washington 
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Consensus (which prioritises political governance over economic governance). It is important 
to note that these are the two dominant models of contemporary development that are 
influencing development paradigms in African countries (Asongu & le Roux, 2018). As 
articulated by Asongu and Ssozi (2016), the Beijing Model can be defined as “de-emphasised 
democracy, state capitalism and priority in economic rights”, whereas the Washington 
Consensus is “liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights”. Political 
rights are consistent with political governance while economic rights are in accordance with 
economic governance.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study focuses on a cross-section of 49 countries in Africa with data from Quintly (which 
is a social media benchmarking and analytics solution company)4 , African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank for the year 
2012. The geographical and temporal scopes are limited by data availability constraints.  
 The governance variables from WGI of the World Bank are consistent with Kaufmann 
et al. (2010). The six indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are bundled by means of 
principal component analysis (PCA) to produce four more governance indicators, notably: (i) 
political governance (entailing “voice & accountability” and political stability/no violence); 
(ii) economic governance (involving regulation quality and government effectiveness); (iii) 
institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and corruption-control), and (iv) general 
governance (entailing political, economic and institutional governance). As clarified in 
section 3.2.1, some of the dependent variables are composite indices that combine qualitative 
indicators or variables using the PCA technique to develop the indices that are quantitative 
dependent variables. 
 Social media is measured with Facebook penetration data from Quintly. These data 
have been employed in a recent strand of literature on the importance of social media in 
institutional outcomes (Jha&Sarangi, 2017; Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Jha & Kodila-Tedika, 
2018).The fact that some of the papers using the Facebook indicator have been published is an 
indication of  the quality of the Facebook penetration data.  
 Four main control variables are adopted in accordance with the governance literature, 
notably:domestic terrorism, primary school enrolment, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
                                                          
4
 The data was accessed from its website 
 (http://www.quintly.com/facebook-countrystatistics?period=1year ). 
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capita and aid to the production sector (Lederman et al., 2005; Cheung & Chan, 2008; Okada 
& Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2016b). With the exception of terrorism 
which has been documented by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) to reduce governance, we 
expect the remaining control variables to positively influence governance. According to 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a, 2016b), economic prosperity is positively linked to 
governance while Okada and Samreth (2012) conclude on a positive aid-governance nexus. 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c) have established that education and lifelong learning 
positively influence governance. This is consistent with the broad stream of literature on a 
positive education-governance nexus (Lederman et al., 2005; Cheung & Chan, 2008) 
The definitions and sources of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, whereas the 
summary statistics and sampled countries are provided in Appendix 2. In the light of the 
summary statistics, we notice that the averages of the variables are comparable. Moreover, 
given the corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated 
linkages will emerge.  
 
3.2 Estimation technique  
3.2.1Principal component analysis (PCA) 
PCA is used to bundle the six governance variables into four composite indices, notably: 
political, economic, institutional and general dynamics of governance.  This process of 
bundling governance indicators in order to increase the policy relevance of the empirical 
analysis is consistent with recent African development literature (Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b). The PCA is a statistical method that is usually employed to reduce a set 
of highly correlated indicators into a smaller set of indices known as principal components 
(PCs). These PCs reflect the variations that are common to the constituent indicators.   
 In the light of the above, this research uses the Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) 
criterion to derive common factors. This criterion requires that PCs with an eigenvalue that is 
higher than one should be retained. The corresponding PCA results which are disclosed in 
Table 1 show that all retained common factors have an eigenvalue of above one and represent 
at least 75% of common information or variability among the constituent indicators. 
Accordingly, general governance (G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.837 with more than 80% of 
common information in the six constituting indicators. In the same vein, institutional 
governance (Instgov), economic governance (Econgov) and political governance (Polgov) 
have total variations of 92.20%, 93.80% and 78.60% and eigenvalues of 1.844, 1.876 and 
1.572, respectively.  
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 Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.394 0.352 0.422 0.433 0.443 0.399 0.806 0.806 4.837 
Second  PC 0.421 -0.821 0.286 0.151 0.044 -0.206 0.082 0.888 0.496 
Third PC -0.541 -0.431 -0.084 0.226 0.074 0.676 0.059 0.948 0.356 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.786 0.786 1.572 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.213 1.000 0.427 
          
First PC (Econgov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.938 0.938 1.876 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.061 1.000 0.123 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.922 0.922 1.844 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.078 1.000 0.156 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
3.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares  
A baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) empirical approach is adopted in the light of the 
cross-sectional nature of the dataset. The choice of this empirical strategy is also consistent 
with the attendant literature using the same data structure, notably: inclusive development 
(Andrés, 2006; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2017), financial development (Kodila-Tedika & 
Asongu, 2015) and ICT (Asongu, 2013a) studies. 
Equation 1 below examines the correlation between social media and governance: 
 
iiii XSMG   321 ,                               (1) 
where iG represents a governance dynamic (“voice & accountability”, political stability/no 
violence, political governance, regulation quality, government effectiveness, economic 
governance, corruption-control, rule of law, institutional governance and general governance), 
whereas iSM   is the social media indicator for country i , 1 is a constant, X  is the vector of 
control variables, and i  the error term. X contains: domestic terrorism, primary school 
enrolment, GDP per capita and aid to the production sector.  
 
3.2.3Quantile Regressions  
  
 The OLS modelling approach in the previous section is based on mean values of 
governance. Whereas these mean nexuses are relevant, complementing them with conditional 
nexuses is also worthwhile. The policy importance of such conditional relationships is 
motivated by the fact that mean-oriented estimates provide blanket implications for policy 
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that may be ineffectiven unless they are contingent on initial levels of governance and tailored 
differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of governance.  
 In accordance with the underlying literature (Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2018), the approach by quantile regressions (QR) is appropriate in emphasizing 
existing levels of an outcome variable in the estimation exercise. The QR is being 
increasingly adopted in scholarly circles in order to increase room for policy implications 
(Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b). Moreover, consistent with Koenker (2005) and 
Hao and Naiman (2007), the QR differs from linear regressions from a plethora of 
perspectives, inter alia, it predicts conditional quantiles (versus conditional mean); needs 
sufficient data (versus an OLS approach when n can be small); follows an agnostic 
distribution (versus the assumption of normality); is robust to the response of outliers (versus 
sensitivity to outliers), and is computationally intensive (versus a linear approach which is 
computationally less intensive).  
The  thquantile estimator of governance is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (2) for the purpose of 
simplicity and readability.   
    

  
 



 


ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
,                                           (2) 
where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations is minimised. For 
example, the 10th or 25th quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) are estimated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of governance or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(   ,                                                                                                        (3) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of governance. For Eq. (3), the dependent variable iy  is a 
governance dynamic whereas ix  contains: a constant term, domestic terrorism, primary school 
enrolment, GDP per capita and aid to the production sector. 
 In the light of the above, separate regression equations for the QR and OLS for each of 
the three investigated hypotheses are needed. 
tititi XPG ,,10,   (4) 
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The OLS and QR respectively in Equation (4) and Equation (5) above focus on the first 
hypothesis of testing the role of social media in political governance, where, tiPG , is political 
governance (consisting of “voice & accountability” and political stability/no violence) in  
country i at  period t , 0 is a constant, X entails social media and other control variables 
(domestic terrorism, primary school enrolment, GDP per capita and aid to the production 
sector),  and ti , is the error term.  
tititi XEG ,,10,                                                                                    (6) 
)(
,,1
)(
1
)(
0,
p
titi
pp
ti XEG                                                                           (7) 
The OLS and QR respectively in Equation (6) and Equation (7) above focus on the second 
hypothesis of testing the role of social media in economic governance,  where tiEG , is an 
economic governance variable (consisting of government effectiveness and regulation quality) 
in  country i at  period t , 0 is a constant, X  entails social media and other control variables 
(domestic terrorism, primary school enrolment, GDP per capita and aid to the production 
sector),  and ti , is the error term.  
tititi XIG ,,10,    (8) 
)(
,,1
)(
1
)(
0,
p
titi
pp
ti XIG                                                                           (9) 
The OLS and QR respectively in Equation (8) and Equation (9) above focus on the third 
hypothesis of testing the role of social media in institutional  governance,  where tiIG , is an 
institutional governance variable (consisting of corruption control and the rule of law) in  
country i at period t , 0 is a constant, X  entails social media and other control variables 
(domestic terrorism, primary school enrolment, GDP per capita and aid to the production 
sector),  and ti , is the error term.  
 
4. Empirical results  
The empirical results are presented in this section. Table 2 presents the relationship between 
social media and political governance, Table 3 shows the results between social media and 
economic governance, Table 4 is concerned with the nexuses between social media and 
institutional governance whereas Table 5 presents relationships between social media and 
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general governance. From all the tables, it is apparent that estimates from the OLS are 
different from corresponding quantile estimates in terms of significance and magnitude of 
significance. This variation between OLS and QR estimates confirms the policy relevance of 
estimating nexuses throughout the conditional distribution of governance dynamics.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 2 on nexuses between social 
media and political governance. First, in Panel A on “political stability/no violence”, the OLS 
estimate is not significant while the linkage is negatively significant in the 10th quantile. 
Second, in Panel B on “voice and accountability”, the OLS estimate is not significant whereas 
the estimates are positively significant with an S-shape from the 10th to the 75th quantile. 
Third, in Panel C on “political governance”,  the OLS estimate is not significant while the 
nexus is positively significant in the 25th quantile. Fourth, the significant control variables 
display the expected signs.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 3 on nexuses between social 
media and economic governance. First, in Panel A on government effectiveness, the OLS 
estimate is positively significant while the QR estimates are significant in the 10th, 25th and 
75th quantiles. Second, in Panel B where regulation quality is the outcome variable, the OLS 
estimate is significant while quantile estimates are also significant with a U-shape from the 
10th to the 75th quantiles. Third, in Panel C on “economic governance”, the OLS estimate is 
positively significant whereas corresponding nexuses from quantiles are exclusively 
significant in the bottom (10th and 25th quantiles) and top (75th and 90th) quantiles.  
The following results are apparent from Table 4 on linkages between social media and 
institutional governance. First, in Panel A on corruption control, the OLS estimate is not 
significant while the quantile regressions estimates are significant from the 10th to the 50th 
quantile in decreasing order. Second, in Panel B on the rule of law, the OLS estimate is 
significantly positive while the estimates from QR are also significant throughout the 
conditional distribution in an S-shape pattern, with the exception of the 25th quantile. Third, in 
Panel C on institutional governance, the OLS estimate is not significant while the quantile 
regression estimates are significant in the 10thand 50th quantiles. Fourth, the significant control 
variables display the anticipated signs.  
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Table 2: Social media and political governance (Hypothesis 1) 
       
 Panel A: Political Stability/No violence 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -4.485*** -5.874*** -6.008*** -5.592*** -2.986 -2.859*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.136) (0.000) 
Facebook Penetration  -0.010 -0.049*** -0.017 0.013 -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.634) (0.000) (0.200) (0.676) (0.711) (0.176) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.471*** -0.376*** -0.344*** -0.550*** -0.642*** -0.497*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.010** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.016** 0.003 0.010*** 
 (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.668) (0.000) 
GDP per capita (log) 1.016*** 1.224*** 1.147*** 1.119** 0.949* 0.778*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.056) (0.000) 
Aid to the production sector  0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005**** 0.007** 0.007** 0.004*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.016) (0.000) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.625 0.596 0.508 0.385 0.323 0.435 
Fisher  15.00***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel B: Voice & Accountability 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -1.944 -0.687** -0.756 -0.593 -2.028* -2.349*** 
 (0.168) (0.022) (0.237) (0.676) (0.088) (0.000) 
Facebook Penetration  0.041 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.041* 0.023* 0.005 
 (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.094) (0.623) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.158** -0.247*** -0.123*** -0.130 -0.133* -0.140** 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.006) (0.236) (0.093) (0.012) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.251) (0.253) (0.144) (0.616) (0.902) (0.876) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.138 -0.389*** -0.425*** -0.335 0.575** 0.779*** 
 (0.756) (0.000) (0.001) (0.366) (0.034) (0.000) 
Aid to the production sector  0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.024) (0.055) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.358 0.430 0.364 0.268 0.298 0.418 
Fisher  9.29***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel C: Political Governance 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -4.153** -2.805** -3.127*** -3.866** -6.199*** -5.840*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.001) (0.047) (0.003) (0.000) 
Facebook Penetration  0.032 0.047 0.037*** -0.004 0.007 -0.009 
 (0.445) (0.200) (0.009) ‘0.882) (0.847) (0.577) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.504*** -0.536*** -0.355*** -0.409*** -0.608*** -0.699*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.013** 0.005 0.012*** 0.007 0.013 0.019*** 
 (0.013) (0.457) (0.001) (0.398) (0.131) (0.007) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.891 0.377 0.287 0.985** 1.832*** 1.670*** 
 (0.129) (0.112) (0.166) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
Aid to the production sector  0.009*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.511 0.399 0.363 0.309 0.446 0.516 
Fisher  10.93***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Political governance is least. 
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Table 3: Social media and economic governance (Hypothesis 2) 
       
 Panel A: Government Effectiveness 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -2.512** -1.248*** -2.311** -3.418*** -2.711** -2.192* 
 (0.033) (0.000) (0.013) (0.008) (0.041) (0.090) 
Facebook Penetration  0.049* 0.061*** 0.042** 0.018 0.044*** 0.037 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.014) (0.459) (0.003) (0.104) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.107* -0.212*** -0.110* -0.076 -0.079 -0.046 
 (0.049) (0.000) (0.091) (0.341) (0.210) (0.751) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.005 0.002** 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 
 (0.175) (0.048) (0.225) (0.420) (0.395) (0.819) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.316 -0.203*** 0.167 0.670** 0.524* 0.517* 
 (0.407) (0.001) (0.568) (0.042) (0.086) (0.055) 
Aid to the production sector  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.524 0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.189) (0.589) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.534 0.439 0.390 0.338 0.408 0.495 
Fisher  9.44***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel B: Regulation Quality 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -1.112 0.071 -0.049 -0.678 -1.345 -2.059* 
 (0.277) (0.932) (0.939) (0.431) (0.332) (0.085) 
Facebook Penetration  0.048* 0.050** 0.043*** 0.031* 0.052*** 0.020 
 (0.083) (0.015) (0.000) (0.086) (0.005) (0.305) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.1350** -0.277*** -0.082 -0.103 -0.064 -0.079 
 (0.043) (0.000) (0.142) (0.133) (0.504) (0.543) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.0004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.00008 -0.002 
 (0.884) (0.273) (0.422) (0.569) (0.989) (0.819) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.082 -0.332 -0.319** 0.062 0.272 0.728*** 
 (0.814) (0.230) (0.045) (0.788) (0.482) (0.005) 
Aid to the production sector  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.222) (0.381) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.453 0.420 0.358 0.271 0.343 0.471 
Fisher  9.08***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel C: Economic Governance 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -2.460 -0.398 -1.718 -3.147* -2.070 -3.142 
 (0.293) (0.295) (0.340) (0.081) (0.184) (0.320) 
Facebook Penetration  0.108* 0.120*** 0.094* 0.053 0.107*** 0.099* 
 (0.071) (0.000) (0.077) (0.134) (0.000) (0.098) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.269** -0.606*** -0.152 -0.297** -0.167* -0.153 
 (0.025) (0.000) (0.172) (0.034) (0.068) (0.660) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.006 0.006*** 0.008 0.005 -0.001 -0.0004 
 (0.342) (0.002) (0.212) (0.491) (0.824) (0.987) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.446 -0.593*** -0.158 0.746 0.881** 1.312* 
 (0.578) (0.000) (0.801) (0.123) (0.039) (0.054) 
Aid to the production sector  0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.024) (0.409) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.511 0.440 0.384 0.326 0.412 0.503 
Fisher  10.22***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Economic governance  is least. 
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Table 4: Social media and institutional governance (Hypothesis 3) 
       
 Panel A: Corruption Control 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -1.799 0.584 -0.551 -1.840*** -3.125** -4.014 
 (0.114) (0.310) (0.660) (0.001) (0.024) (0.457) 
Facebook Penetration  0.035 0.056*** 0.046* 0.027*** -0.002 -0.035 
 (0.140) (0.000) (0.054) (0.004) (0.870) (0.501) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.094 -0.091 -0.188** -0.124*** -0.167* -0.170 
 (0.118) (0.109) (0.048) (0.002) (0.070) (0.618) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.003 -0.007** 0.0008 -0.003* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.377) (0.010) (0.870) (0.092) (0.625) (0.887) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.213 -0.393*** -0.251 0.514*** 0.826*** 1.269 
 (0.587) (0.008) (0.565) (0.000) (0.007) (0.427) 
Aid to the production sector  0.002** 0.002** 0.003* 0.002** 0.001 0.0002 
 (0.037) (0.019) (0.089) (0.010) (0.228) (0.948) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.284 0.330 0.250 0.263 0.298 0.306 
Fisher  4.08***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel B: Rule of Law 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -2.471** -3.066*** -2.349* -2.583 -2.536* -2.767*** 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.093) (0.117) (0.079) (0.000) 
Facebook Penetration  0.042* 0.041*** 0.037 0.066** 0.037** 0.022* 
 (0.086) (0.000) (0.107) (0.025) (0.026) (0.058) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.146*** -0.210*** -0.163** -0.194** -0.196** -0.114 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.132) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.005* 0.011*** 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.006 
 (0.090) (0.000) (0.141) (0.526) (0.645) (0.254) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.331 0.163 0.114 0.351 0.570* 0.647*** 
 (0.300) (0.123) (0.782) (0.404) (0.071) (0.000) 
Aid to the production sector  0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004 0.002 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.128) (0.197) (0.789) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.535 0.445 0.340 0.287 0.371 0.523 
Fisher  7.54***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
       
 Panel C: Institutional Governance 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -3.300 -2.412** -1.942 -4.186 -4.924 -6.415 
 (0.162) (0.043) (0.422) (0.111) (0.166) (0.153) 
Facebook Penetration  0.087 0.106*** 0.101 0.089* 0.036 -0.022 
 (0.104) (0.000) (0.162) (0.063) (0.369) (0.777) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.268** -0.412*** -0.418** -0.360* -0.398 -0.366 
 (0.024) (0.001) (0.015) (0.041) (0.101) (0.472) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.010 0.013** 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.011 
 (0.183) (0.025) (0.200) (0.692) (0.798) (0.766) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.606 -0.220 -0.212 1.148* 1.684** 2.263** 
 (0.446) (0.435) (0.803) (0.099) (0.034) (0.022) 
Aid to the production sector  0.006***   0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.003 0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.112) (0.389) (0.940) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.419 0.375 0.305 0.283 0.336 0.383 
Fisher  5.96***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Economic governance  is least. 
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Table 5: Social media and general governance (Robustness check) 
 Dependent variable: General governance 
       
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
       
Constant  -5.671 -4.780*** -2.599 -6.200 -7.489*** -8.510** 
 (0.123) (0.000) (0.339) (0.308) (0.006) (0.041) 
Facebook Penetration  0.135 0.153*** 0.168** 0.084 0.095*** 0.035 
 (0.131) (0.000) (0.042) (0.489) (0.003) (0.617) 
Domestic Terrorism    -0.589*** -0.972*** -0.530*** -0.630* -0.564*** -0.586 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.090) (0.003) (0.202) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.017* 0.029*** 0.019* 0.010 0.016 0.013 
 (0.099) (0.000) (0.060) (0.715) (0.265) (0.698) 
GDP per capita (log) 1.104 -0.209 -0.521 1.587 2.300*** 3.026*** 
 (0.378) (0.335) (0.585) (0.323) (0.000) (0.001) 
Aid to the production sector  0.014*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015 0.006* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.057) (0.478) 
       
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R² 0.493 0.421 0.363 0.304 0.395 0.509 
Fisher  9.38***      
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations whereGeneral  governance is least. 
 
The following findings can be established in Table 5 on the correlates between general 
governance and social media. OLS estimates are not significant whereas the corresponding 
quantile estimates are positively significant in the bottom quantiles and 75th quantile. The 
significant control variables have the anticipated signs.   
It is also apparent from the findings that the intercept is significantly negative for the 
most part. This implies that irrespective of determinants of governance, autonomous 
governance is negative. It follows that if there are no determinants of governance, governance 
is negative. This negativity may be traceable to the fact that the governance variables in 
African countries are overwhelmingly negatively skewed.  
 In the light of the above, all the investigated hypotheses are confirmed, with a slight 
exception, notably the negative relationship between Facebook penetration and political 
stability in the 10th quantile of Table 2. The counter-intuitive findings can be explained from 
the perspective that social media has also been documented to grease violent collective action 
(Breuer et al., 2012; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda 
& Tesei, 2016). Hence, social media can also reduce government quality, especially in the 
light of Morozov (2011) who has noted that information technology can be captured and used 
as an instrument of propaganda by incumbent governments.  
 It is also relevant to articulate that the 49 observations decrease to 36 due to data 
availability constraints in Facebook penetration and governance variables.  The retained 36 
countries include: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial 
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Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Tunisia and Zambia.  
 The quantile regressions are presented such that the findings vary from countries with 
low governance quality to countries with high governance quality. Hence, in order to facilitate 
the understanding of corresponding implications, it is worthwhile to complement results with 
a presentation of the country-specific institutional indicators in increasing order of 
importance. In other words, for the engaged governance dynamics, the upper parts of Tables 
6-7 reflect countries with low levels of governance while the lower parts reflect countries with 
higher levels of governance. Table 6 presents country-specific political and economic 
governance levels while Table 7 shows country-specific institutional and general governance 
levels. From a quick comparative perspective, it is apparent that established findings in 
bottom quantiles are driven by countries with French civil law transition while results in the 
top quantiles are driven by countries with English common law transition.  The competitive 
edge of countries with British common law heritage (compared to their counterparts with 
French civil law heritage) can be explained by political and adaptability perspectives 
documented by Beck et al. (2003) on why legal origins are relevant in comparative 
development.   
First, according to the political channel, English common law countries place more priority in 
private property rights while French civil law countries are more concerned with the power of 
the State. Hence, the relevance of social media as a right, may be more consistent with the 
existing laws in countries with English common law heritage.  Second, from the adaptability 
channel, because of more emphasis on jurisprudence, English common law is designed to 
quickly adapt to changes in society and the evolution of technology (e.g. the advent of social 
media) compared to French civil law which is dominated by the strict interpretation of laws 
by judges.  Moreover, the dominance of English common law countries has been confirmed in 
various areas of governance, notably: accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998); less 
corruption and better institutions (La Porta et al., 1999); courts with enhanced efficiency 
(Djankov et al., 2003) and development outcomes in Africa (Asongu, 2014; Agbor, 2015; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018).   
However, note should also be taken of the fact that Tables 6-7 are meant to inform policy 
makers on the associations between sampled countries, governance levels and established 
results. Causality cannot be drawn from such associations as they remain exploratory and 
informative.  
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Table 6: Country-specific governance levels (political and economic governances) 
             
 Voice & 
Accountability 
Political stability/No 
violence 
Political Governance Regulation Quality Government 
Effectiveness 
Economic Governance 
 Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value 
 
1 Equatorial 
Guinea 
 
-1.883 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -2.137 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.982 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.510 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.659 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.938 
2 Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
 
-1.509 
Mali -2.021 
Central 
African 
Republic -1.548 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.423 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.650 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.831 
 
3 Republic of 
the Congo 
-1.509 Central 
African 
Republic -1.872 Burundi -1.049 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.378 Chad -1.493 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.279 
 
 
4 Djibouti 
-1.417 
Burundi -1.685 Chad -1.019 Algeria -1.293 
Central 
African 
Republic -1.462 Chad -1.278 
5 
Chad 
-1.346 
Egypt -1.465 Mali -0.955 
Central 
African 
Republic -1.089 Togo -1.326 
Central 
African 
Republic -1.253 
6 The Gambia -1.278 Algeria -1.319 Guinea -0.909 Chad -1.080 Burundi -1.312 Guinea -0.971 
7 Central 
African 
Republic 
-1.264 
Kenya -1.316 Algeria -0.782 Guinea -1.020 Guinea -1.278 Burundi -0.940 
8 Rwanda -1.257 Guinea -1.281 Egypt -0.763 Burundi -0.958 Sierra Leone -1.204 Togo -0.844 
9 
Swaziland 
-1.196 
Niger -1.160 
Republic of 
the Congo -0.756 Cameroon -0.933 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.202 Sierra Leone -0.543 
10 Guinea -1.059 Mauritania -1.130 Mauritania -0.698 Togo -0.856 Djibouti -1.096 Cameroon -0.455 
11 
Togo 
-1.042 
Chad -1.057 
Equatorial 
Guinea -0.610 Malawi -0.715 Madagascar -1.089 Algeria -0.448 
12 Cameroon -1.031 Tunisia -0.742 Swaziland -0.401 Sierra Leone -0.707 Mali -0.986 Madagascar -0.271 
13 Mauritania -0.957 Burkina Faso -0.587 Cameroon -0.357 Mauritania -0.645 Mauritania -0.922 Mauritania -0.158 
14 Algeria -0.898 Madagascar -0.582 Rwanda -0.296 Niger -0.608 Cameroon -0.904 Djibouti -0.134 
15 Burundi -0.891 Cameroon -0.577 Togo -0.242 Madagascar -0.577 Egypt -0.800 Mali 0.014 
16 
Madagascar 
-0.872 Republic of 
the Congo -0.492 Kenya -0.208 Swaziland -0.562 Niger -0.707 Niger 0.125 
17 Egypt -0.765 Morocco -0.462 Madagascar -0.207 Lesotho -0.537 Tanzania -0.693 Egypt 0.150 
18 
Morocco 
-0.634 
Swaziland -0.421 Djibouti -0.177 Egypt -0.490 
Mozambiqu
e -0.634 Malawi 0.250 
19 
Mali 
-0.535 
Togo -0.407 The Gambia -0.164 
Mozambiqu
e -0.459 
Burkina 
Faso -0.630 Swaziland 0.353 
20 
Sierra Leone 
-0.351 
Sierra Leone -0.280 Niger -0.120 Djibouti -0.445 Swaziland -0.549 
Mozambiqu
e 0.371 
21 Burkina Faso -0.335 Rwanda -0.202 Morocco 0.112 Zambia -0.429 Algeria -0.547 Tanzania 0.371 
22 Niger -0.335 Senegal -0.116 Tunisia 0.305 Mali -0.423 Kenya -0.539 Zambia 0.555 
23 Kenya -0.305 South Africa -0.021 Burkina Faso 0.307 Tanzania -0.399 Benin -0.526 Lesotho 0.561 
24 Malawi -0.223 The Gambia 0.001 Sierra Leone 0.521 Benin -0.394 The Gambia -0.513 Benin 0.563 
25 Tunisia -0.218 Malawi 0.003 Malawi 0.856 Kenya -0.310 Zambia -0.500 Kenya 0.641 
 
26 Mozambique 
-0.198 
Tanzania 0.023 Tanzania 0.908 The Gambia -0.230 Malawi -0.491 
Burkina 
Faso 0.748 
27 Tanzania -0.184 Ghana 0.107 Senegal 0.947 Tunisia -0.208 Senegal -0.471 The Gambia 0.759 
 
28 Zambia 
-0.143 
Djibouti 0.165 Mozambique 1.130 
Burkina 
Faso -0.119 Lesotho -0.388 Senegal 0.954 
 
29 Senegal 
-0.036 Equatorial 
Guinea 0.187 Lesotho 1.300 Rwanda -0.101 Ghana -0.072 Tunisia 1.305 
30 Lesotho 0.045 Lesotho 0.253 Zambia 1.382 Senegal -0.095 Morocco -0.069 Morocco 1.410 
31 Benin 0.094 Benin 0.319 Benin 1.397 Morocco -0.092 Rwanda -0.060 Rwanda 1.410 
32 Namibia 0.370 Mozambique 0.339 Ghana 1.536 Namibia 0.065 Tunisia -0.049 Ghana 1.635 
33 Ghana 0.401 Zambia 0.606 South Africa 1.589 Ghana 0.117 Namibia 0.131 Namibia 1.807 
34 Botswana 0.503 Namibia 0.939 Namibia 2.125 South Africa 0.374 South Africa 0.325 South Africa 2.365 
35 South Africa 0.556 Mauritius 0.962 Botswana 2.359 Botswana 0.694 Botswana 0.447 Botswana 2.854 
36 Mauritius 0.864 Botswana 1.080 Mauritius 2.619 Mauritius 0.984 Mauritius 0.951 Mauritius 3.740 
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Table 7: Country-specific governance levels (institutional and general governances) 
         
 Corruption-Control  The Rule of Law   Institutional Governance   General Governance   
 Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value Countries Value 
1 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.561 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.653 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.840 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -3.316 
2 
Burundi -1.439 Chad -1.454 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.734 
Equatorial 
Guinea -2.465 
3 Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.304 
Central 
African 
Republic   -1.446 Chad -1.565 
Central 
African 
Republic -2.258 
4 Cameroon -1.267 Guinea -1.433 Burundi -1.392 Chad -2.252 
5 
Chad -1.251 
Equatorial 
Guinea -1.263 Guinea -1.330 Burundi -1.941 
6 Republic of 
the Congo -1.192 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.117 Cameroon -1.145 Guinea -1.867 
7 
Kenya -1.094 Burundi -1.079 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.137 
Republic of 
the Congo -1.848 
8 
Guinea -1.073 Cameroon -1.039 
Central 
African 
Republic -1.129 Cameroon -1.144 
9 Togo -1.020 Togo -0.940 Kenya -0.753 Togo -1.082 
10 Sierra Leone -0.952 Mauritania -0.904 Togo -0.744 Mauritania -0.681 
11 Benin -0.932 Madagascar -0.901 Sierra Leone -0.591 Algeria -0.611 
12 Central 
African 
Republic -0.894 Sierra Leone -0.873 Mauritania -0.354 Mali -0.611 
13 Tanzania -0.802 Kenya -0.866 Mali -0.200 Sierra Leone -0.399 
14 Mali -0.785 Djibouti -0.777 Madagascar -0.160 Madagascar -0.380 
15 Mauritania -0.726 Algeria -0.754 Benin -0.111 Kenya -0.169 
16 The Gambia -0.643 Niger -0.694 Tanzania -0.079 Egypt -0.139 
17 Niger -0.633 Mali -0.693 Niger -0.020 Djibouti -0.081 
18 Egypt -0.586 Mozambique -0.598 Algeria 0.105 Niger 0.006 
19 Mozambique -0.577 Tanzania -0.559 The Gambia 0.128 Swaziland 0.323 
20 Madagascar -0.566 The Gambia -0.544 Mozambique 0.149 The Gambia 0.430 
21 Burkina Faso -0.520 Swaziland -0.460 Djibouti 0.199 Tanzania 0.663 
22 Algeria -0.476 Egypt -0.460 Egypt 0.284 Burkina Faso 0.847 
23 Malawi -0.442 Benin -0.443 Burkina Faso 0.394 Mozambique 0.911 
24 Morocco -0.440 Burkina Faso -0.431 Swaziland 0.554 Benin 1.026 
25 Djibouti -0.376 Zambia -0.403 Zambia 0.618 Malawi 1.029 
26 Swaziland -0.360 Senegal -0.320 Malawi 0.688 Morocco 1.336 
27 Zambia -0.358 Lesotho -0.287 Morocco 0.720 Zambia 1.436 
28 Senegal -0.292 Rwanda -0.263 Senegal 0.784 Senegal 1.544 
29 South Africa -0.165 Malawi -0.242 Tunisia 1.134 Tunisia 1.629 
30 Tunisia -0.145 Morocco -0.214 Lesotho 1.295 Lesotho 1.803 
31 Ghana -0.103 Tunisia -0.155 Ghana 1.312 Rwanda 1.835 
32 Lesotho 0.106 Ghana -0.036 South Africa 1.355 Ghana 2.586 
33 Namibia 0.292 South Africa 0.075 Rwanda 1.968 South Africa 3.082 
34 Mauritius 0.391 Namibia 0.238 Namibia 2.075 Namibia 3.455 
35 Rwanda 0.648 Botswana 0.654 Mauritius 2.948 Botswana 4.908 
36 Botswana 0.919 Mauritius 0.950 Botswana 3.265 Mauritius 5.407 
         
 
5. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions 
This study has assessed linkages between social media and governance dynamics in 49 
African countries for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on ordinary least squares 
and quantile regressions. Ten bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are used, notably: 
(i) political governance (entailing “voice & accountability” and political stability/no 
violence); (ii) economic governance (involving regulation quality and government 
effectiveness); (iii) institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and corruption-
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control) and (iv) general governance (entailing political, economic and institutional 
governance). Social media is measured with Facebook penetration. The findings show that 
Facebook penetration is positively associated with governance dynamics and these positive 
nexuses differ in terms of significance and magnitude of significance throughout the 
conditional distribution of governance dynamics. In what follows, we justify why the findings 
and corresponding implications can be extended to other regions of the world, especially 
those that are equally characterized by poor governance and low penetration levels in social 
media. 
 It is important to note that extending the implications of the findings to other regions 
with similar characteristics as Africa does not necessarily imply that social media will 
enhance all dimensions of governance being considered. For example, contingent on the 
development paradigm being adopted by a country, political governance may be emphasized 
in place of economic governance, as a strategy for economic prosperity and human 
development. Therefore, policy makers need to consider how “social media”-driven 
governance can influence their development outcomes, with the development paradigm of the 
country in mind. To put this caution into perspective, there are currently two dominant 
development models that have different governance priorities, namely: the Beijing Model and 
the Washington Consensus. Consistent with Asongu and Ssozi (2016), the Washington 
Consensus can be defined as “liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political 
rights” while the Beijing Model can be defined as “de-emphasised democracy, state 
capitalism and priority in economic rights”. In the light of the framework of this study, 
political (economic) rights are consistent with political (economic) governance.   
 The coupling and decoupling of governance dynamics also offers more avenues for 
policy options. This is essentially because even within a specific dimension of governance, 
priorities from the two dominant models could still be quite distinct. For instance, from the 
perspective of political governance (i.e. consisting of  “voice and accountability” and political 
stability), China, which advocates for the BeijingModel, enjoys relatively greater political 
stability compared to African countries which have largely embraced prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus and, hence, are more in tune with the “voice and accountability” 
aspect of political governance. In a nutshell, the conclusions of this study are relevant to other 
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developing countries, contingent on adopted development paradigms on the one hand and 
priorities in governance dynamics for economic development, on the other hand5. 
 The findings established in the study are interpreted as relationships owing to data 
availability constraints at the time of the study. Hence, as more data become available, it will 
be worthwhile to explore whether and how the established findings withstand empirical 
scrutiny within a causality empirical framework. Moreover, country-specific analyses will 
also be worthwhile for more idiosyncratic policy implications. It is also unfortunate that we 
cannot increase the number of observations because we are focusing on a specific region 
andwe are constrained by data availability. Given that the exploratory findings can be 
informative for other regions of the world that are experiencing similar tendencies in poor 
governance and low information technology penetration, it would be worthwhile to also 
assess if the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny in different regions. The 
recommendation is motivated by the fact that different regions are driven by countries that 
have adopted different paradigms of economic development. Hence, social media may not be 
positively related with all governance dynamics. Furthermore, as more data become available 
it will be worthwhile to confirm the dominance of English common law countries over their 
French civil law counterparts, within a panel empirical framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5More insights can be found in Asongu and le Roux (2018). In the light of blur prospects for Africa in the MDGs 
and SDGs (Bicaba et al., 2017; Asongu et al., 2017), the authors have recently built on these two dominant 
models and corresponding governance dynamics to elicit the extreme poverty tragedy of Africa.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
   
 
Political Stability  
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
Voice & 
Accountability  
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and to 
enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
Political 
Governance  
First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & Accountability. 
The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
   
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political pressures of 
the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
Regulation  Quality  “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
Economic 
Governance  
“First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and Regulation 
Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & implement policies, and 
to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
   
 
Rule of Law  
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
 
Corruption-Control  
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
   
Institutional 
Governance  
First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. The 
respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
   
General 
Governance  
First Principal Component of Political, Economic and Institutional 
Governances   
PCA 
   
Facebook 
Penetration   
Facebook penetration (2012), defined as the percentage of total population 
that uses Facebook. 
Quintly. 
   
Domestic Terrorism Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (log) Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
   
Primary School 
Enrolment   
School enrollment, primary (% gross), WDI World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita (log), WDI World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
Aid to the 
Productive sector  
Foreign aid directed at the productive sector like 
agriculture, industry, mining, construction, trade 
and tourism(log)/OECD. 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
WGI: World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. WDI: World Development Indicators of the World Bank. GDP: 
Gross Domestic Product. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. PCA: Principal Component 
Analysis.   
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Political Stability 
-0.648 0.898 -2.846 1.080 49 
      
Voice & Accountability 
-0.742 0.707 -2.233 0.863 49 
      
Political Governance  -0.131 1.199 -3.210 2.619 49 
      
Government Effectiveness  
-0.794 0.615 -2.225 0.951 48 
      
Regulation Quality  -0.692 0.659 -2.256 0.983 49 
      
Economic Governance  -0.603 1.378 -3.395 3.739 48 
      
Rule of Law  -0.747 0.611 -2.450 0.949 49 
      
Corruption Control  -0.699 0.565 -1.590 0.918 49 
      
Institutional Governance  -0.157 1.272 -3.028 3.264 49 
      
General Governance  -0.182 2.130 -5.562 5.406 48 
      
Facebook Penetration 4.345 5.828 0.286 27.693 44 
      
Domestic terrorism   0.928 1.525 0.000 6.234 49 
      
Primary School Enrolment 106.315 18.799 69.538 145.186 39 
      
GDP per capita (log) 2.953 0.485 2.185 4.074 48 
      
Aid to the Public sector   43.444 61.624 0.04 281.21 49 
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (49) 
 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d' 
Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt,  Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
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